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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
The Southwestern Pennsylvania Growth Alliance 
("SWPGA") has petitioned for review of a final rule of the 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), 61 Fed. Reg. 
19,193 (May 1, 1996). In this rule, the EPA denied the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's request that the EPA 
redesignate the Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley nonattainment 
area (the "Area") to attainment status for ozone, pursuant 
to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7407(d)(3). An intervenor, 
Advanced Manufacturing Network, contends that the EPA's 
final rule is invalid because the EPA did not comply with 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12. Although 
we are sympathetic to the view expressed by many within 
the Area that this rule threatens serious economic harm, 
we recognize that our role as a reviewing court is strictly 
limited. We conclude that under the applicable legal 
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A. Congress enacted the Clean Air Act to "protect and 
enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to 
promote the public health and welfare and the productive 
capacity of its population." 42 U.S.C. §7401(b)(1). To 
achieve this purpose, the Act authorizes the EPA to identify 
air pollutants that are sufficiently dangerous to warrant 
federal regulation. See 42 U.S.C. §7408(a). For each 
pollutant that the EPA identifies, the Act authorizes the 
EPA to promulgate a national ambient air quality standard 
(NAAQS), which is the maximum allowable concentration of 
the pollutant in the ambient air. See 42 U.S.C. §7409(a). 
 
One pollutant for which the EPA has promulgated a 
NAAQS is ozone, whose chemical precursors are emitted by 
industrial and transportation sources. See 40 C.F.R. 
§50.9(a) (1996). The EPA measures ozone levels at 
monitoring sites located throughout the country. When a 
monitoring site measures that a given day's "maximum 
hourly average ozone concentration" has exceeded the 
NAAQS, an "exceedance" has occurred. See 40 C.F.R. §50, 
App. H (1996). If a monitoring site registers more than an 
average of one exceedance per year, over a three-year 
period, that site is in noncompliance with the NAAQS. Id. 
 
The Clean Air Act's 1990 amendments provide that the 
EPA designate areas of the country as either "attainment" 
areas, "nonattainment" areas, or "unclassifiable" areas for 
particular pollutants, depending on whether an area has 
complied with the NAAQS for that pollutant. See 42 U.S.C. 
7407(d). If one monitoring site within an area is in 
noncompliance with a NAAQS, then the entire area is 
designated a nonattainment area for that pollutant. See 40 
C.F.R. Pt. 50.9(a); 40 C.F.R. Pt. 50, App. H (1996). 
Nonattainment areas are further classified as "marginal," 
"moderate," "serious," "severe," or "extreme" nonattainment 
areas, according to the extent to which the area's monitor 
readings exceed the NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C.§7511a. 
 
                                5 
The Clean Air Act assigns to the states the responsibility 
for assuring air quality within each state. See 42 U.S.C. 
§7407(a). The Act provides that within three years of the 
EPA's promulgation of a NAAQS for a pollutant, each state 
must submit to the EPA a state implementation plan ("SIP") 
specifying measures that will attain, maintain, and enforce 
the NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. §7410(a). All SIPs must meet the 
substantive requirements enumerated at 42 U.S.C. 
§7410(a)(2). Once the EPA finds that a SIP complies with 
the Act, the EPA will approve the SIP. See 42 U.S.C. 
§7410(k). When the EPA has designated an area within a 
state as a nonattainment area for a particular pollutant, 
that state must modify its SIP to include increasingly strict 
pollution controls delineated in the Act, depending on the 
area's nonattainment classification. See 42 U.S.C. §7511a. 
 
The Act specifies the procedures through which the EPA 
may redesignate an area from nonattainment to attainment. 
The process begins when the governor of a state submits a 
request for redesignation. See 42 U.S.C. §7407(d)(3)(D). 
Then, "[w]ithin 18 months of receipt of a complete State 
redesignation submittal, the [EPA] Administrator shall 
approve or deny such redesignation." Id. Under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7407(d)(3)(E), the EPA Administrator "may not promulgate 
a redesignation of a nonattainment area . . . to attainment 
unless" the following five criteria are met: 
 
(i) the Administrator determines that the area has 
attained the national ambient air quality standard; 
 
(ii) the Administrator has fully approved the applicable 
implementation plan for the area under section 7410(k) 
of this title; 
 
(iii) the Administrator determines that the improvement 
in air quality is due to permanent and enforceable 
reductions in emissions resulting from implementation 
of the applicable implementation plan and applicable 
Federal air pollutant control regulations and other 
permanent and enforceable reductions; 
 
(iv) the Administrator has fully approved a 
maintenance plan for the area as meeting the 
requirements of section 7505a of this title; and 
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(v) the State containing such area has met all 
requirements applicable to the area under section 7410 
of this title and part D of this subchapter. 
 
Id. Thus, in order for the EPA to redesignate an area from 
nonattainment to attainment, the EPA must find that all 
five of these criteria have been satisfied. 
 
B. In 1990, the EPA classified the Pittsburgh-Beaver 
Valley Area (the "Area") as a moderate nonattainment area 
for ozone.1 See 56 Fed. Reg. 56,694, 56,820 (Nov. 6, 1991). 
The EPA based this designation on ozone exceedances 
during the three-year period from 1987 to 1989. See id. In 
November 1993, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Resources submitted to the EPA a request 
to redesignate the Area to attainment status for ozone. The 
redesignation request pointed out that the Area had 
attained the NAAQS for ozone during the three-year period 
from 1991-1993, with only two exceedances in 1991, zero 
exceedances in 1992, and one exceedance in 1993. See 61 
Fed. Reg. 19,193, 19,195 (May 1, 1996). Pennsylvania's 
request acknowledged that its SIP had not yet been fully 
approved by the EPA, but stated that the state expected to 
receive full EPA approval shortly. The request also included 
a maintenance plan, under which Pennsylvania 
demonstrated how it planned to maintain the NAAQS in the 
area until the year 2004.2 
 
In July 1995, the EPA published a final notice of 
determination that the Area was in attainment of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley Area comprises Allegheny County, 
Armstrong County, Beaver County, Butler County, Fayette County, 
Washington County and Westmoreland County. 
 
2. Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Resources subsequently 
submitted two revisions to this maintenance plan. First, in January 
1995, the Department submitted a revision acknowledging that the 
original submission was incomplete, because it relied upon measures 
that had not been fully adopted. The Department submitted the second 
revision in May 1995. This revision acknowledged that the original 
submission had relied upon an automobile inspection and maintenance 
program that Pennsylvania had suspended, as well as a contingency 
measure for the use of reformulated gasoline, which Pennsylvania had 
also suspended. 
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NAAQS for ozone. See 60 Fed. Reg. 37,015 (July 19, 1995). 
Later in the summer of 1995, however, ozone monitors in 
the Area recorded 16 exceedances over a seven-day period. 
Two of these monitors recorded more than three 
exceedances each. After confirming these data, the EPA 
revoked its earlier determination that the Area had attained 
the NAAQS for ozone. See 61 Fed. Reg. 28,061 (June 4, 
1996). 
 
The EPA also published a notice of proposed rulemaking 
stating its intention to disapprove Pennsylvania's 
redesignation request and maintenance plan. See 61 Fed. 
Reg. 4,598 (Feb. 7, 1996). The EPA expressed various 
reasons for proposing disapproval. One of the EPA's 
reasons was that the 1995 summer ozone exceedances 
indicated that the Area had not attained the NAAQS. The 
EPA also reasoned that these exceedances indicated that 
the underlying basis for Pennsylvania's maintenance plan 
was no longer valid. See id. After public comment, the EPA 
promulgated a final rule disapproving Pennsylvania's 
redesignation request and maintenance plan. See 61 Fed. 
Reg. 19,193 (May 1, 1996). 
 
C. The petitioner in this case is the Southwestern 
Pennsylvania Growth Alliance, which is an organization of 
major manufacturers and local governments in the 
Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley Area. SWPGA contests the EPA's 
denial of Pennsylvania's request to redesignate the Area to 
attainment status. As previously explained, 42 U.S.C. 
§7407(d)(3)(E) lists five requirements that must be satisfied 
in order for the EPA to redesignate a nonattainment area to 
attainment status. Since the EPA's final rule stated that 
none of these five criteria had been satisfied, the petitioner, 
if it is to prevail, must demonstrate that the EPA erred in 
its determinations as to all five of §7407(d)(3)(E)'s criteria. 
 
The petitioner thus faces an exacting burden. Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A), this 
court must uphold the EPA's action unless it is "arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law." In applying this standard, our "only 
task is to determine whether [the EPA] considered the 
relevant factors and articulated a rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made." Baltimore 
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Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983). The EPA's disapproval of 
Pennsylvania's redesignation request "would be arbitrary 
and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider". Motor Vehicle 





SWPGA first argues that the EPA erred when it 
determined that the Area did not attain the NAAQS for 
ozone. In so arguing, SWPGA contends that the EPA had no 
basis for concluding that the first of 42 U.S.C. 
§7407(d)(3)(E)'s five requirements was not satisfied. We 
hold, however, that it was proper for the EPA to determine 
that the Area did not attain the NAAQS for ozone. 
 
A. The petitioner contends that the EPA acted contrary 
to the language of the Clean Air Act when it took into 
consideration the ozone exceedances that were recorded in 
the summer of 1995. The petitioner points to language in 
the Act stating that "[w]ithin 18 months of receipt of a 
complete State redesignation submittal, the Administrator 
shall approve or deny such redesignation." 42 U.S.C. 
§7407(d)(3)(D) (emphasis added). The petitioner argues that 
the use of the word "shall" in this provision imposes upon 
the EPA a mandatory duty to act on a state's redesignation 
request within 18 months of submission. According to the 
petitioner, the EPA violated this mandatory duty when it 
took into consideration the 1995 ozone exceedance data, 
because these data did not exist during the 18-month 
period. The petitioner concludes that without these 
improperly considered data, there was no valid reason for 
the EPA to deny redesignation. 
 
We agree with the EPA that the petitioner may not raise 
this argument on appeal because this argument was not 
raised during the rulemaking process. "Generally, federal 
appellate courts do not consider issues that have not been 
passed on by the agency . . . whose action is being 
reviewed." New Jersey v. Hufstedler, 724 F.2d 34, 36 n.1 
(3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 632 (1985). 
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The petitioner points to the following passage from the 
record as evidence that Pennsylvania raised this argument 
in its comments to the EPA's proposed rule disapproving 
redesignation: 
 
Pennsylvania believes that the Pittsburgh ozone 
nonattainment area should have been redesignated by 
EPA to attainment. The Commonwealth submitted the 
request in 1993, and EPA had ample opportunity and 
justification. 
 
For the six year period from 1989 through 1994 the 
national ambient air quality standard for ozone was 
achieved. During this time eight ozone monitors 
operated for the full six years and one additional 
monitor operated two years at one site and the four 
subsequent years at a nearby site. Six of these 
monitors had no exceedances during this period and 
the remaining monitors stayed under the standard. 
Thus for the four consecutive three-year periods from 
1989 through 1994, the Pittsburgh area attained and 
maintained the ambient standard. 
 
Comments on Proposed Disapproval of Request to 
Redesignate Pittsburgh Ozone Nonattainment Area, J.A. at 
550. Pennsylvania further commented that "the Pittsburgh 
area [had not] been redesignated in a timely manner." Id. at 
551. 
 
We hold that these comments are insufficient to preserve 
petitioner's intricate statutory interpretation argument. 
These comments admittedly demonstrate that 
Pennsylvania, during the rulemaking process, broached the 
question whether the EPA had acted in a timely manner. 
Yet the comments include neither a reference to a statutory 
provision imposing a specific time limit, nor an explicit 
argument that the existence of such a time limit precluded 
the EPA from considering the 1995 exceedances. The 
petitioner thus raises its statutory interpretation argument 
for the first time on appeal. 
 
We recognize that ("our practice has been to hear issues 
not raised in earlier proceedings when special 
circumstances warrant an exception to the general rule.)" 
Hufstedler, 724 F.2d at 36 n.1 (considering the retroactivity 
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of amendments to a federal education act, even though the 
retroactivity argument was not raised in the lower court, 
because it was "an issue of national importance" that was 
"singularly within the competence of appellate courts" and 
"not predicated on complex factual determinations"); see 
also Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69 (3d 
Cir. 1983). Although a variety of circumstances have 
prompted appellate courts to apply this exception,"[t]he 
matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for 
the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the 
discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the 
facts of individual cases." Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 
121 (1976). In this case, we find it inappropriate to consider 
this new issue. Although appellate courts are certainly 
capable of addressing questions of statutory interpretation 
that were not raised during an agency's rulemaking 
process, it is far more efficient for courts to face such 
questions only after they have been considered by the 
agency that Congress has charged with the primary 
responsibility for enforcing the complex statute in question. 
 
In the instant case, both the EPA and Pennsylvania's 
Department of Environmental Resources possess special 
expertise regarding the workings of the Clean Air Act. 
Pennsylvania was thus fully capable of explicitly raising the 
argument that 142 U.S.C. §7407(d)(3)(D) requires the EPA 
to act on a redesignation request within 18 months. Had 
Pennsylvania made such an explicit argument, the EPA 
would have then applied its singular expertise on the Act's 
mechanics and made a ruling that would inform the 
deliberations of this court on appeal. If this court were to 
consider the petitioner's argument without the benefit of 
the EPA's expert input, we would undermine a fundamental 
principle of our system of judicial review of administrative 
decisions. 
 
The harm that would come to the petitioner as a result of 
this outcome is not so great as to warrant disregarding 
these concerns. See, e.g., North Alamo Water Supply Corp. 
v. City of San Juan, 90 F.3d 910, 916 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 117 S.Ct. 586 (1996) (an appellate court should 
invoke its discretion to review a purely legal issue not 
raised below when "a miscarriage of justice would result 
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from [the court's] failure to consider it)." For these reasons, 
we hold that the petitioner may not raise for the first time 
in this proceeding its argument that 42 U.S.C. 
§7407(d)(3)(D) required the EPA to act on Pennsylvania's 
redesignation request within 18 months. 
 
Moreover, even if we were to reach the merits of the 
petitioner's argument, we would hold that 42 U.S.C. 
§7407(d)(3)(D) did not preclude the EPA from considering 
the summer 1995 exceedance data. The language of the 
provision that enumerates the redesignation criteria tends 
to support this result. Under 42 U.S.C. §7407(d)(3)(E)(i), the 
EPA Administrator "may not" promulgate a redesignation of 
a nonattainment area unless, among other things, "the 
Administrator determines that the area has attained the 
national ambient air quality standard." The use of the term 
"has attained" instead of "attained" may be interpreted as 
suggesting that the attainment must continue until the 
date of the redesignation. 
 
In any event, even if we assume for present purposes that 
the language of 42 U.S.C. §7407(d)(3)(E) is ambiguous as to 
whether the EPA may disregard data arising after the 
expiration of the 18-month period, we must defer to the 
EPA's interpretation of this provision under the rule of 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron instructs reviewing 
courts that if Congress has not "directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue . . . the question for the court is 
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute." Id. at 842-43. The EPA has 
published numerous legislative rules that have interpreted 
42 U.S.C. §7407(d)(3)(E) as obliging the EPA to deny a 
redesignation request if the EPA knows that the area is not 
in present attainment of the NAAQS,3 because the EPA's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. 19,193, 19,197 (1996) (the final rule denying 
Pennsylvania's request to redesignate the Area, in which the EPA "note[d] 
that it has not and may not (in light of section 107(d)(1)(A)(i) and 
107(d)(3)(E)) approve a redesignation request for an area that is violating 
the ozone standard"); 61 Fed. Reg. 4,958, 4,599 (1996) (the proposed 
rule denying Pennsylvania's request to redesignate the Area, in which 
the EPA concluded that "the Pittsburgh area no longer meets 
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interpretation is a reasonable construction of the statute. 
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (when Congress has implicitly 
delegated to an agency the authority to "elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation," a reviewing court 
"may not substitute its own construction of a statutory 
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency"). 
 
The petitioners contend that §7407(d)(3)(D) prohibits the 
EPA from considering any data acquired more than 18 
months after the submission of Pennsylvania's 
redesignation request. They assert -- correctly, in our view 
-- that the use of the word "shall" in §7407(d)(3)(D) imposes 
upon the EPA a mandatory duty to act on a state's 
redesignation request within 18 months. The petitioner's 
argument fails, however, because §7407(d)(3)(D)'s use of the 
word "shall" does not conclusively indicate that Congress 
intended to prohibit the EPA from taking action after the 
expiration of the statutorily specified time period. 
 
The Supreme Court faced a similar question of statutory 
interpretation in Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 
(1986). At issue in Brock was a provision of the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act ("CETA") 
stating that the Secretary of Labor "shall" issue a final 
determination as to the misuse of CETA funds by a grant 
recipient within 120 days after receiving a complaint 
alleging such misuse. See id. at 254-55. The Department of 
Labor disallowed almost $500,000 of CETA expenditures by 
a county, after an investigation revealed that those funds 
had not been used in accordance with the CETA program. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
[§7407(d)(3)(E)'s] first criteria for redesignation" in light of the summer 
1995 exceedances); 59 Fed. Reg. 37,190, 37,195 (1994) (a proposed rule 
redesignating the Detroit-Ann Arbor area to attainment status, in which 
the EPA warns that if "data shows violations of the ozone NAAQS before 
the final USEPA action on this redesignation, the USEPA proposes that 
it disapprove the redesignation request"); 59 Fed. Reg. 22,757 (1994) (a 
final rule in which the EPA denied redesignation of the Richmond, 
Virginia area because that area did "not meet the statutory criteria for 
redesignation to attainment found in section 107(d)(3)(E) of the CAA," 
even though the area's only ozone exceedance was registered after the 
EPA published a rule proposing approval of the redesignation request). 
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The county argued that the Secretary of Labor could not 
recover the misused funds because the Secretary did not 
issue his final determination of misuse until more than 120 
days after the Department received the initial complaint. 
 
The Supreme Court thus faced the question whether the 
use of the word "shall" in the CETA statute prohibited the 
Secretary from recovering misused funds after the 
expiration of the 120-day period. A unanimous Court 
concluded that "the mere use of the word `shall' " was not 
enough to demonstrate that Congress intended to prohibit 
the Secretary from acting after 120 days. Id. at 262. In so 
deciding, the Court stated that it "would be most reluctant 
to conclude that every failure of an agency to observe a 
procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action." 
Id. at 260. The Court instead concluded that "the normal 
indicia of congressional intent" should determine whether 
an agency may act after the expiration of a statutory 
deadline. See id. at 262 n.9. 
 
Here, the petitioner has not brought to our attention 
anything in the Clean Air Act itself (other than the use of 
the word "shall" in 42 U.S.C. §7407(d)(3)(D)), or anything in 
the Act's legislative history that shows that Congress 
intended for the EPA to lose its power to consider data 
brought to its attention after the expiration of the 18-month 
deadline. To the contrary, two important aspects of the 
Clean Air Act strongly suggest that Congress did not intend 
for the EPA to lose its power to act after 18 months. The 
first is the Act's failure to specify a consequence for 
noncompliance with the 18-month deadline. As the 
Supreme Court has observed, "if a statute does not specify 
a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing 
provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary course 
impose their own coercive sanction." United States v. James 
Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1983). 
 
Second, the Clean Air Act affords a less drastic remedy 
than that urged by the petitioner. In Brock, the Supreme 
Court stated that when "there are less drastic remedies 
available for failure to meet a statutory deadline, courts 
should not assume that Congress intended the agency to 
lose its power to act." Brock, 476 U.S. at 260. The Brock 
court's conclusion that there existed a less drastic remedy 
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in that case provides guidance for our present inquiry. 
Noting that "nothing in CETA appears to bar an action to 
enforce the 120-day deadline," the Brock court concluded 
that anyone within the statute's zone of interests could 
have brought an action to force the Secretary of Labor to 
act within the statutory deadline. Id. at 260 n.7. Thus, 120 
days after the original complaint, the defendant in Brock 
could have brought an action to force the Department of 
Labor to drop its investigation, provided that the defendant 
could achieve standing by successfully arguing that 
Congress enacted the 120-day limit in order "to protect 
grant recipients from lengthy delays in audits." Id. 
 
Similarly, in the present case, either the petitioner or the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania could have brought an 
action to enforce the 18-month deadline in 42 U.S.C.  
§7407(d)(3)(D).4 The petitioner has not called to our 
attention any provision of the Clean Air Act that would have 
precluded such an action. Had the petitioner brought such 
an action, the result would have been far less drastic than 
that which the petitioner now urges, which is the 
redesignation of an area that is not in attainment of the 
NAAQS. 
 
After oral argument, the parties have called to our 
attention certain new facts that must be considered. First, 
in 1995 the EPA issued a direct final notice redesignating 
LaFourche Parish, Louisiana, as an attainment area. After 
the publication of this notice, but prior to its effective date, 
a monitor recorded a violation of the NAAQS for ozone in 
the LaFourche Parish area. Although the EPA was aware of 
this exceedance, the EPA did not withdraw the notice, and 
the LaFourche Parish area was redesignated as an 
attainment area for ozone on the notice's effective date. The 
petitioner argues that this redesignation demonstrates that 
the EPA is not precluded from redesignating an area that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Such an enforcement action would have been available pursuant to 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. #8E8E # 701-706, which entitles 
any person "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action" to judicial 
review, §702, unless the relevant statute precludes judicial review or 
"agency action is committed to agency discretion by law," §701(a). In 
such an enforcement action, a court would have authority to "compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." §706(1). 
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experiences an exceedance while a redesignation request is 
pending. 
 
The EPA's redesignation of the LaFourche Parish area in 
no way undermines the analysis set forth in this opinion. 
As discussed above, we accept the view that the EPA may 
not redesignate an area if the EPA knows that the area is 
not meeting the NAAQS. The EPA's redesignation of the 
LaFourche Parish redesignation was thus not proper. 
However, the fact that the EPA apparently acted contrary to 
law in a prior case did not permit, much less require, the 
EPA to disregard the law in the instant case. See Kokechik 
Fishermen's Assoc. v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795, 
802-03 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[p]ast administrative practice that 
is inconsistent with the purpose of an act of Congress 
cannot provide an exception"). 
 
The same analysis applies to the second incident that the 
parties have brought to our attention. In at least one case, 
the EPA has excluded exceedance data from its evaluation 
of a redesignation request because the data came from 
monitors that were not part of the State or Local Air 
Monitoring Stations network ("SLAMS") required by 40 
C.F.R. §58 (1996). The petitioner contends that such 
incidents undermine the proposition that EPA is required to 
deny a redesignation request when it possesses knowledge 
that the NAAQS is not being attained. Assuming arguendo 
that the EPA's exclusion of non-SLAMS exceedance data 
violates the EPA's duty not to redesignate an area that fails 
to attain the NAAQS, the EPA's prior disregard of this duty 
did not relieve the EPA of its obligation to act correctly in 
other cases. 
 
B. The petitioner further attacks the EPA's conclusion 
that the Area did not attain the NAAQS by arguing that the 
EPA failed to take into account data demonstrating that 
much of the offending ozone originated outside the Area. 
The petitioner contends that ozone readings from border 
monitors demonstrate that much of the ozone contributing 
to the exceedances during the summer of 1995 originated 
in neighboring states and was transported into the Area by 
wind. In its final rule denying redesignation, the EPA 
included the following analysis of the interstate ozone 
transport question: 
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 Pennsylvania has made no demonstration that the 
ozone problem in the Pittsburgh area is caused by 
transport from upwind sources. An adequate technical 
demonstration, including emissions data and a 
modeling analysis, must be provided to support any 
claim of transport-dominated nonattainment. 
 
 Although ozone levels recorded at monitors near the 
West Virginia/Ohio/Pennsylvania border seem to 
correlate with the levels recorded further east in the 
nonattainment area, this data is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that the Pittsburgh area's ozone problem 
is due to transport. During the summer of 1995, on the 
days when monitors in the Pittsburgh area 
("downwind" monitors in Allegheny and Westmoreland 
Counties) recorded exceedances of the ozone standard, 
ozone levels at the monitors on the western border of 
the Pittsburgh area (the "upwind" monitors in Beaver 
and Washington Counties, Pennsylvania) recorded 
increased levels of ozone. However, these "upwind" 
monitors did not record any exceedances of the ozone 
standard. In other words, "downwind" monitors in the 
Pittsburgh area always recorded higher ozone levels 
than the monitors at the western border. This 
demonstrates the Pittsburgh area is causing its own 
exceedances by generating ozone in the area. . . . 
 
. . . [E]ven if the violations in Pittsburgh could be 
attributed to transport, EPA would not have the 
authority to redesignate Pittsburgh to attainment.[42 
U.S.C. §7407(d)(1)(A)(ii)] defines an attainment area as 
an area "that meets" the national ambient air quality 
standard and [§7407(d)(3)(E)] prohibits EPA from 
redesignating an area to attainment unless EPA 
determines that the area is attaining the standard. As 
an area that is experiencing violations of the ozone 
standard is not attaining the standard, EPA is not 
authorized by the Clean Air Act to redesignate such an 
area to attainment. 
 
61 Fed. Reg. 19,193, 19,194 (May 1, 1996). 
 
The petitioner contends that the EPA "failed to 
adequately analyze and consider the role transported ozone 
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and ozone precursors played in the Area's 1995 
exceedances." Pet'r. Br. at 28. Although the petitioner does 
not seem to argue that these exceedances were caused 
solely by transported ozone, the petitioner maintains that 
such ozone plainly contributed to the 1995 exceedances. 
See id. The petitioner states that "[t]here is nothing in the 
record upon which the EPA bases its assumption that 
exceedances are attributable solely to sources within the 
border when high ozone levels are being transported into 
the Area." Id. at 29. 
 
In response, the EPA argues that the Clean Air Act and 
its implementing regulations "require that EPA determine 
whether or not an area has met the NAAQS and satisfied 
the first criterion for redesignation without regard to why 
the NAAQS and the criterion many not have been met." 
Resp't. Br. at 30. In essence, then, the EPA maintains that 
the origin of the ozone that caused the 1995 exceedances 
was legally irrelevant. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,193 19,194 
(the EPA's final rule denying Pennsylvania's request to 
redesignate the Area). The EPA goes on, however, to defend 
its scientific analysis of the role of transported ozone in the 
Area. 
 
In evaluating the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air 
Act, we must apply the familiar Chevron analysis to which 
we previously referred. Under this analysis, if "Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. . . the 
court . . . must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. If, 
however, the "precise question at issue" is one about which 
Congress has been either "silent or ambiguous," then a 
reviewing court must defer to the agency's statutory 
interpretation if it is "based on a permissible construction 
of the statute" Id. at 843. 
 
Here, the EPA contends that the Clean Air Act itself 
prohibited allowances for ozone transported from outside 
the Area. The EPA relies in part on 42 U.S.C. 
§7407(d)(1)(A)(ii), which provides that an attainment area is 
one that "meets" the NAAQS, and 42 U.S.C. 
§7407(d)(3)(E)(i), which prohibits the EPA from 
redesignating an area to attainment unless the EPA 
determines that the area "has attained" the NAAQS. These 
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provisions are certainly consistent with and lend some 
support to the EPA's interpretation. 
 
Somewhat stronger support for the EPA's argument is 
furnished by other provisions of the Act. The first of these 
is 42 U.S.C. §7511a(h), which establishes "rural transport 
areas." These are areas that do not attain the NAAQS for 
ozone, despite not producing any significant amount of 
ozone themselves. Congress addressed the problem that 
ozone transport causes rural transport areas by exempting 
such areas from certain pollution control requirements, 
provided that the areas make certain submissions to the 
EPA. Although such areas can enjoy relaxed control 
requirements, they must remain in nonattainment status, 
because they have not attained the NAAQS for ozone. 
 
Congress also addressed the problem of ozone transport 
in 42 U.S.C. §7511(a)(4), which describes certain 
circumstances under which the EPA may adjust a 
nonattainment area's classification (e.g., from "severe" to 
"serious"). Under this provision, if a nonattainment area 
meets criteria making it eligible for adjustment of its 
classification, there are several factors that the EPA may 
consider when making the adjustment. One of these factors 
is "the level of pollution transport between the area and 
other affected areas, including both intrastate and 
interstate transport." Id. Thus, under this provision, the 
EPA may consider pollutant transport when adjusting a 
nonattainment area's classification, but pollution transport 
does not affect the area's designation as a nonattainment 
area. 
 
Although these provisions provide significant support for 
the EPA's interpretation, we need not, and do not, go so far 
as to hold that the Clean Air Act dictates that 
interpretation. For present purposes, it is enough to hold 
that even if the Act would permit a different interpretation, 
the EPA's interpretation is plainly a reasonable one to 
which, under Chevron, we must defer. Accordingly, we 
accept the EPA's position that the origin of the ozone that 
caused the exceedances at issue is legally irrelevant. 
 
After oral argument, the EPA brought to our attention 
certain administrative actions that must be addressed in 
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connection with this analysis. First, the EPA pointed out 
that it has issued a "Guideline on the Identification and 
Use of Air Quality Data Affected by Exceptional Events." 
See Letter from Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, 
Environment and Natural Resources Division, to the Court 
at 3 (May 8, 1997), referring to U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Office of Air 
Quality Planning and Standards, Monitoring and Data 
Analysis Division, Guideline on the Identification and Use of 
Air Quality Data Affected by Exceptional Events, EPA- 
450/4-86-007 (July 1986). This Guideline permits the 
exclusion from consideration, for various regulatory 
purposes, of data affected by certain exceptional events. 
The only exceptional event that applies to ozone data is a 
"stratospheric ozone intrusion." This is a phenomenon that 
occurs when a parcel of air from the stratosphere suddenly 
falls to ground level, as occasionally happens during severe 
thunderstorms. See id., referring to the Guideline at 4.1.2. 
Second, the EPA has noted that in considering certain other 
redesignation requests, it has excluded ozone data as 
having been influenced by forest fires. See id. 
 
The petitioner contends that it is inconsistent for the EPA 
to exclude ozone data that is influenced by stratospheric 
ozone intrusions or forest fires, but not to exclude ozone 
data that is influenced by interstate ozone transport. This 
inconsistency, the petitioner contends, undermines the 
argument that the Clean Air Act prohibits the EPA from 
redesignating an area that is not in attainment, even in 
cases when the nonattainment is attributable to ozone that 
has been transported from outside the area. 
 
The petitioner's argument, however, does not disturb our 
conclusion that the EPA's interpretation of the Act as 
precluding allowances for transported ozone, even if not 
statutorily compelled, is nevertheless reasonable. The EPA's 
view that allowances are permissible in cases of 
stratospheric ozone intrusions and forest fires is not at 
issue here, and does not prove that the EPA's position 
concerning transported ozone is unreasonable. 
 
C. In light of our deference to the EPA's interpretation of 
the Act as precluding allowances for transported ozone, the 
petitioner's attack on the EPA's scientific evaluation of the 
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role of transported ozone is beside the point. Yet even if it 
were not, we would see no ground for disturbing that 
analysis. A reviewing court "must generally be at its most 
deferential" when reviewing factual determinations within 
an agency's area of special expertise. New York v. E.P.A., 
852 F.2d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 
1065 (1989). It is not the role of a reviewing court to 
"second-guess the scientific judgments of the EPA." 
American Mining Congress v. E.P.A., 907 F.2d 1179, 1187 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). Rather, we must "review the record to 
ascertain that the agency has made a reasoned decision 
based on reasonable extrapolations from some reliable 
evidence, to ensure that the agency has examined the 
relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for 
its action including a rational connection between the facts 
found and the choice made." Id. (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
 
If we were to review the EPA's final rule under this 
standard, we would conclude that the EPA considered the 
relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for 
its findings. In its response to comments concerning the 
interstate transport of ozone, the EPA considered the 
correlation between border ozone readings and the ozone 
levels in the Area, but concluded that the data from the 
border was insufficient to demonstrate that ozone transport 
"caused" the exceedances in the Area. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 
19,194. The EPA supported its conclusion by noting that 
the ozone levels were higher within the Area (where the 
exceedances were registered) than at the border (where no 
exceedances were detected), demonstrating that the Area 
was "causing its own exceedances by generating ozone in 
the [A]rea." Id. Contrary to the petitioner's suggestion, we 
do not interpret the EPA's explanation to mean that it 
found that transported ozone did not contribute to the 1995 
exceedances. Rather, the EPA found only that the 
exceedances were not "caused by" or "due to" transported 
ozone. 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,194. Since the EPA considered 
the relevant data and articulated a rational connection 
between these data and its conclusion, we cannot disturb 
the EPA's factual determinations. 
 
D. We thus conclude that the EPA did not act arbitrarily 
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or capriciously, did not abuse its discretion, and did not act 
contrary to law when it determined that the Pittsburgh- 
Beaver Valley area was not attaining the national ambient 
air quality standard for ozone. Since 42 U.S.C. 
§7407(d)(E)(i) prohibits the EPA from redesignating an area 
that is not in attainment of the NAAQS, the EPA correctly 
denied Pennsylvania's request for redesignation. We thus 
do not need to consider the petitioner's arguments that the 
EPA erred in determining that §7407(d)(E)'s four other 
criteria were also not met, since §7407(d)(E) provides that 
nonfulfillment of any one of its five criteria will prohibit the 





We next consider the contention of the intervenor, 
Advanced Manufacturing Network ("AMN"), that the EPA's 
final rule denying Pennsylvania's redesignation request was 
invalid because the EPA did not comply with the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12. We conclude that the 
intervenor may not raise its RFA argument in this 
proceeding because this argument was not adequately 
presented to the EPA during the rulemaking process. In the 
alternative, we hold that the intervenor's RFA argument 
lacks merit, because the EPA's final rule is sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of the RFA. 
 
A. The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires administrative 
agencies to give public consideration to the impact that a 
proposed regulation will have on small entities, including 
small businesses, small not-for-profit enterprises, and 
small local governments. See 5 U.S.C. §601(3)-(6). Under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We find no merit to the petitioner's contention that it was inconsistent 
for the EPA to create de minimis exceptions to §7407(d)(E)'s criteria in 
some other cases but not in the instant case. An area's failure to attain 
a NAAQS is the most fundamental criterion in its designation as a 
nonattainment area. This is demonstrated by §7407(d)(1)(A)(i), which 
defines a "nonattainment" area as "any area that does not meet [the 
NAAQS] for the pollutant". The Area's failure to meet the NAAQS for 
ozone is thus a far cry from the types of trivialities that warrant the 
creation of a de minimis exception. 
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the RFA, at two points during the rulemaking process, an 
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis, which 
is an assessment of the proposed rule's effects on small 
entities. First, whenever an agency is required by law to 
publish a proposed rule, the agency must prepare an initial 
regulatory flexibility analysis. See 5 U.S.C. 603(a). Second, 
whenever an agency promulgates a final rule after having 
been required to publish a proposed rule, the agency must 
prepare a final regulatory flexibility analysis. See 5 U.S.C. 
604(a). The RFA exempts an agency from the requirement 
to publish the two regulatory flexibility analyses if the 
agency "certifies that the rule will not, if promulgated, have 
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities." 5 U.S.C. 605(b). 
 
In its final rule disapproving Pennsylvania's request for 
redesignation, the EPA made the following certification 
statement, which summarized a similar statement in the 
proposed rule: 
 
As described in the [notice of proposed rulemaking], 
EPA has determined that the disapproval of the 
redesignation request will not affect a substantial 
number of small entities. EPA's denial of the 
Commonwealth's redesignation request under [42 
U.S.C. §7407(d)(3)(E)] does not affect any existing 
requirements applicable to small entities nor does it 
impose new requirements. The area retains its current 
designation status and will continue to be subject to 
the same statutory requirements. To the extent that 
the area must adopt regulations, based on its 
nonattainment status, EPA will review the effect of 
those actions on small entities at the time the 
Commonwealth submits those regulations. 
 
61 Fed. Reg. 19,193, 19,197. 
 
The intervenor argues that this statement is not sufficient 
to satisfy the requirements of the RFA. Specifically, the 
intervenor contends that this statement is conclusory 
because it mentions neither the number of small entities 
that the EPA believes the rule will affect, nor the number of 
small entities that the EPA believes to be "substantial." The 
intervenor argues that the EPA erred in concluding that the 
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rule would not affect a substantial number of small entities. 
In the intervenor's view, the rule will affect small entities 
because the retention of the Area's nonattainment status 
will soon require the EPA to reclassify the Area from 
moderate nonattainment status to serious nonattainment 
status, thereby subjecting small entities within the Area to 
heightened pollution control requirements. 
 
B. We must consider whether we have jurisdiction to 
hear the intervenor's RFA argument. The intervenor asserts 
that we have jurisdiction over the RFA claim pursuant to 
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996 ("SBREFA"), which amended the RFA to provide, inter 
alia, for judicial review of agency action under the RFA. See 
Pub. L. No. 104-121, §242, 110 Stat. 857, 865-66 (1996) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §611) ("For any rule 
subject to this chapter, a small entity that is adversely 
affected or aggrieved by final agency action is entitled to 
judicial review of agency compliance with the requirements 
of [the RFA]"). The EPA retorts that the SBREFA 
amendments do not provide jurisdiction over the 
intervenor's RFA claim, because the EPA published its final 
rule before the effective date of the SBREFA amendments. 
Thus, in order to determine whether we have jurisdiction 
over the intervenor's RFA claim, we must determine 
whether the SBREFA amendment allowing judicial review of 
RFA claims applies to legislative rules that were 
promulgated before the effective date of the SBREFA 
amendments. 
 
The Supreme Court analyzed the question of the 
temporal reach of new statutes in Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994), and Lindh v. Murphy, No. 96- 
6298, 1997 WL 338568 (U.S. June 23, 1997). In Landgraf, 
the Court provided the following guidance to lower courts 
considering the temporal reach of new federal statutes: 
 
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after 
the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine 
whether Congress has expressly prescribed the 
statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of 
course, there is no need to resort to judicial default 
rules. When, however, the statute contains no such 
express command, the court must determine whether 
 
                                24 
the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., 
whether it would impair rights a party possessed when 
he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, 
or impose new duties with respect to transactions 
already completed. If the statute would operate 
retroactively, our traditional presumption [against 
retroactive applicability] teaches that it does not govern 
absent clear congressional intent favoring such a 
result. 
 
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. 
 
In Lindh, the Supreme Court explained that this language 
from Landgraf does not mean that there exist only two 
possible means of determining questions of temporal reach, 
namely, an "express command" or the Landgraf default 
rule. See Lindh at *3-4. Instead, this language reaffirms the 
traditional rule that courts will not apply statutes having 
retroactive effect unless Congress expressly indicated that it 
intended for such application. This clear statement rule has 
no bearing on other inquiries related to questions of 
temporal reach, including "determining whether a statute's 
terms would produce a retroactive effect" and "determining 
a statute's temporal reach generally." Id. To such inquiries 
"our normal rules of construction apply." Id. 
 
Following Landgraf and Lindh, we consider whether the 
SBREFA amendments indicate the temporal reach of the 
amendment concerning judicial review. The only portion of 
the SBREFA amendments that mentions applicability to 
past EPA action is the following: 
 
This subtitle shall become effective on the expiration of 
90 days after the date of enactment of this subtitle, 
except that such amendments shall not apply to 
interpretative rules for which a notice of proposed 
rulemaking was published prior to the date of 
enactment. 
 
Pub. L. No. 104-121, §245, 110 Stat. 857, 868 (1996). 
 
The intervenor argues that since this provision expressly 
provides that the amendments do not apply to interpretive 
rules that were promulgated before the effective date, the 
amendments must apply to legislative rules that were 
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promulgated before the effective date, such as the 
legislative rule denying redesignation of the Area. This 
negative inference, drawn from application of the statutory 
interpretation canon expressio unis est exclusio alterius, is 
very convincing. See Lindh, 1997 WL 338568 at *4-*5. 
 
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the SBREFA 
amendment concerning judicial review does not 
retroactively alter substantive rights, duties or liabilities. In 
its discussion of retroactive applicability, Landgraf 
distinguishes between two categories of intervening 
statutes. The first category consists of statutes that 
"attach[ ] new legal consequences to events completed 
before [the statutes'] enactment." Landgraf, 511 U.S. 269- 
70. Such statutes "would impair rights a party possessed 
when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, 
or impose new duties with respect to transactions always 
completed." Id. at 280. To such statutes, the courts apply 
a "deeply rooted" "presumption against statutory 
retroactivity," because "considerations of fairness dictate 
that individuals should have an opportunity to know what 
the law is and conform their conduct accordingly." Id. at 
265, 273, 265. 
 
The second category of intervening statutes consists of 
statutes that "authorize[ ] or affect[ ] the propriety of 
prospective relief." Id. at 273. Application of such a statute 
to events that took place before the statute's enactment "is 
unquestionably proper" because no substantive rights are 
retroactively affected. Id. Courts have thus "regularly 
applied intervening statutes conferring or ousting 
jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay when the 
underlying conduct occurred." Id. at 274. 
 
We hold that the amendment entitling small entities to 
judicial review of agency compliance with the RFA falls 
within Landgraf's second category. This is because the 
amendment does not retroactively alter any substantive 
rights or duties, since the SBREFA amendment allowing 
judicial review did not change the substantive RFA 
requirements that applied to the EPA's promulgation of the 
final rule denying redesignation. SBREFA's judicial review 
amendment instead prospectively changed the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts to allow judicial review of an agency's 
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compliance with the RFA. We must apply such a statute to 
a rule promulgated before the statute's enactment. As 
indicated above, we hold that the text of the SBREFA 
amendments support this conclusion. 
 
We note that the United States District Court for the 
District of Maine reached the opposite conclusion in 
Associated Fisheries v. Daley, 954 F.Supp. 383 (D. Maine 
1997). The court in that case held that the SBREFA 
amendment concerning judicial review did not apply to a 
rule promulgated before the SBREFA amendments. In so 
ruling, the Associated Fisheries court observed that, in 
addition to the provision concerning judicial review, the 
SBREFA amendments also contained provisions imposing 
new substantive requirements upon an agency that 
undertakes a regulatory flexibility analysis under the RFA. 
Since such substantive requirements cannot be applied to 
rules promulgated before the amendments, the court 
concluded that it "would be anomalous to apply the judicial 
review portion of the [SBREFA] amendments to past agency 
actions but at the same time not apply the substance of 
those amendments, unless Congress expressly stated that 
was its intent." Id. at 387. 
 
We disagree with the Associated Fisheries court's 
conclusion that the SBREFA's judicial review provision and 
substantive provisions must be treated uniformly for 
purposes of applicability to past agency actions. The 
Supreme Court in Landgraf addressed this precise question 
when it held that §102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
should govern cases arising before its enactment, even 
though other provisions of that Act imposed new 
substantive requirements. The Landgraf Court reasoned as 
follows: 
 
[T]here is no special reason to think that all the diverse 
provisions of the Act must be treated uniformly for 
[purposes of applicability to past conduct]. To the 
contrary, we understand [the statute's] instruction that 
the provisions are to "take effect upon enactment" to 
mean that courts should evaluate each provision of the 
Act in light of ordinary judicial principles concerning 
the application of new rules to pending cases and pre- 
enactment conduct. 
 
                                27 
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. 
 
We conclude that it is proper to apply the SBREFA's 
judicial review amendment to past agency action, even 
assuming that it would be inappropriate to apply the 
SBREFA's substantive amendments to past agency action. 
For these reasons, we conclude that we have jurisdiction 
over the intervenor's RFA claim, pursuant to the SBREFA's 
judicial review amendment. 
 
C. EPA contends that the intervenor may not raise its 
RFA argument because the petitioner, SWPGA, did not raise 
this argument in its own brief. It is a general rule that an 
intervenor may argue only the issues raised by the 
principal parties and may not enlarge those issues. See 
Vinson v. Washington Gas Light Co., 321 U.S. 489, 498 
(1944); Synovus Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 952 F.2d 
426, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The intervenor contends that the 
petitioner sufficiently raised the RFA issue in its brief 
through the following incorporation by reference: 
 
Petitioner incorporates by reference the statement of 
issues raised by Intervenor with regard to whether EPA 
erred in certifying under the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
that its disapproval of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania's request for redesignation would have no 
effect on small entities. 
 
Petitioner's Br. at 2 n.3. 
 
The EPA argues that such an incorporation by reference 
is insufficient to satisfy the rule that a principal party must 
raise an issue in its brief before an intervenor may argue it. 
In support of this argument, the EPA points to Time Warner 
v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 
S.Ct. 911 (1996). The court in Time Warner was presented 
with an intervenor's claim that certain FCC orders did not 
comply with the RFA and the Small Business Act ("SBA"). 
The only mention of the RFA and SBA arguments in the 
brief of the Time Warner petitioners was "a short two- 
sentence footnote." Id. This footnote "neither explain[ed] nor 
develop[ed] the statutory challenges, noting only that the 
intervenors' brief [would] discuss this issue." Id. (internal 
quotation omitted). The Time Warner court concluded that 
such a "terse reference in a complex regulatory case is 
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insufficient to raise an issue unrelated to petitioners' other 
challenges and not discussed elsewhere in their briefs or 
even mentioned in their petition for review." Id. 
 
We agree with the EPA that under Time Warner 
intervenor AMN could not raise its RFA argument because 
petitioner SWPGA's incorporation by reference did not 
sufficiently broach the issue. However, we decline to follow 
Time Warner on this point. In its analysis of this issue, the 
Time Warner court relied on Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 
171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.), and Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n v. United States R.R. Retirement Board, 
749 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See id. We believe that 
the Time Warner court misapplied these precedents when it 
concluded that an intervenor may not raise an argument 
that a principal party mentions only in an incorporation by 
reference. 
 
The court in Carducci reviewed a federal employee's 
claims that he was unlawfully reassigned to a position of 
lower rank. In his complaint, the disgruntled employee 
asserted, inter alia, that his employing agency violated his 
Fifth Amendment right to due process when it reassigned 
him. The district court's opinion, which dismissed the 
employee's complaint, did not discuss his due process 
claim. In his appellate brief, the employee expressed his 
due process argument only through a single assertion that 
an official who reviewed the reassignment "rel[ied] on 
information not contained in the grievance file or record 
when he issued his final decision on the grievance." 
Carducci, 714 F.2d at 176. 
 
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit did not 
address the employee's due process claims because the 
employee had "made no attempt to address the issue." Id. 
at 177. The court stated that it would not resolve the 
complex legal issues that the employee's claim presented 
"on the basis of briefing and argument by counsel which 
literally consisted of no more than the assertion of violation 
of due process rights, with no discussion of case law 
supporting that proposition or of the statutory text and 
legislative history relevant" to the legal questions involved. 
Id. The court so ruled because consideration of complicated 
legal questions without proper briefing by the parties would 
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ultimately deprive the courts of the assistance of counsel 
that our adversarial system assumes. Id. 
 
We endorse the Carducci court's conclusion that 
appellate courts generally should not address legal issues 
that the parties have not developed through proper briefing. 
However, the situation in Carducci differs dramatically from 
that in both Time Warner and the instant case, in which a 
party has adopted by reference an argument that is 
thoroughly developed in an intervenor's brief. As then- 
Judge Scalia explained in the Court of Appeals' decision in 
Carducci, deciding legal issues without proper briefing can 
result in bad decisions. No similar danger is presented, 
however, when a petitioner incorporates by reference an 
argument that is fully developed in an intervenor's brief. We 
thus disagree with Time Warner on this point, and we hold 
that when a principal party adopts by reference an 
argument that an intervenor fully briefs, the intervenor may 
argue the question just as if the principal party had fully 
briefed the issue itself. 
 
We find further support for our conclusion in the fact 
that this practice does not differ substantively from the 
practice of an appellant's (or appellee's) adopting by 
reference part of the brief of a coappellant (or coappellee), 
which is expressly permitted under Fed. R. App. P. 28(i). 
Applying this analysis to the instant case, we conclude that 
intervenor AMN is not precluded from raising its RFA 
argument by the fact that petitioner SWPGA adopted the 
intervenor's RFA argument by reference, rather than fully 
developing the argument in its own brief. 
 
D. Although we have jurisdiction over the intervenor's 
RFA claim, and although the parties have properly briefed 
the question, we hold that the intervenor may not raise this 
issue in this proceeding because it was never presented to 
the EPA during the rulemaking process. "Generally, federal 
appellate courts do not consider issues that have not been 
passed on by the agency . . . whose action is being 
reviewed." Hufstedler, 724 F.2d at 36 n.1. 
 
The intervenor has not identified any section of the 
record in which the EPA was presented with an argument 
that mentions the applicability of the RFA to the EPA's 
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rulemaking. The only section of the record that the 
intervenor has identified as relevant to its RFA argument is 
a discussion of the circumstances that will result in a 
"bump up" of an area's nonattainment classification. See 
Intervenor's Reply Br. at 8, citing J.A. at 298. The 
intervenor argues that this discussion is relevant to its 
argument that retention of the Area's nonattainment status 
will affect small entities by subjecting them to enhanced 
pollution control requirements when the EPA subsequently 
"bumps up" the Area's nonattainment classification. This 
argument is flawed, however, because the section of the 
record to which the intervenor points discusses the 
nonattainment classification of the Reading area, not the 
Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley area. See id. Since the intervenor 
has brought to our attention no other portion of the record 
relevant to its RFA argument, we conclude that the 
intervenor may not raise this argument before this Court 
because this argument was never presented to the EPA 
during the rulemaking process. 
 
E. We hold in the alternative that the EPA's certification 
statement satisfies the requirements of the RFA. The EPA's 
statement complies fully with 5 U.S.C. §605(b), which sets 
out certain circumstances under which the requirement of 
a regulatory flexibility analysis does not apply. Under 
§605(b), an agency may avoid preparing a regulatory 
flexibility analysis if the agency publishes in the Federal 
Register a certification that "the rule will not, if 
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities." 5 U.S.C. §605(b). 
Along with this certification, the agency must also publish 
a "statement providing the factual basis for such 
certification." Id. The intervenor contends that the EPA 
violated this provision because the EPA's statement did not 
sufficiently explain the agency's reasons for the 
certification. According to the intervenor, the statement is 
deficient because it mentions neither the number of small 
entities that the EPA believes the rule will affect, nor the 
number of small entities that the EPA believes to be 
"substantial." 
 
We hold that the EPA's statement is sufficient to satisfy 
the requirements of §605(b). Directly applicable to this 
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inquiry is Colorado State Banking Bd. v. Resolution Trust 
Corp., 926 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1991). In that case, the 
Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") adopted a rule that 
would allow banks to operate acquired insolvent thrifts as 
bank branches, notwithstanding Colorado and New Mexico 
laws that prohibited such operation. These two states 
contended that the RTC's adoption of the rule did not 
satisfy the §605(b) criteria for exemption from the obligation 
to undertake a regulatory flexibility analysis. In 
promulgating the rule, the RTC published the following 
certification statement: 
 
The basis for the RTC's certification is its 
determination that the rule will not impose compliance 
requirements on depository institutions of any size. It 
imposed no performance standards, no fees, no 
reporting or recordkeeping criteria, nor any other type 
of restriction or requirement with which depository 
institutions must comply. Thus, it does not have the 
type of economic impact addressed by the EPA. 
 
Id. at 948. 
 
The Tenth Circuit held that the RTC's brief statement 
"present[ed] a valid basis for certification" because it 
addressed the RFA's concern for "the high cost to small 
entities of compliance with uniform regulations." Id., 
quoting Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327, 
342 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Similarly, the EPA's statement in the 
instant case, which closely resembles the RTC's statement 
in Colorado State Banking Board, adequately addressed this 
concern by noting that the denial of redesignation"does not 
affect any existing requirements applicable to small entities 
nor does it impose new requirements." 61 Fed. Reg. 19,193, 
19,197. 
 
We also find no merit in the intervenor's contention that 
the EPA erred when it concluded that the final rule would 
not affect the requirements applicable to small entities. The 
intervenor argues that the EPA's disapproval of 
Pennsylvania's redesignation request will soon result in a 
"bump up" of the Area's nonattainment classification from 
"moderate" to "severe." This will happen, the intervenor 
posits, because 42 U.S.C. §7511(b)(2)(A) provides that an 
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area that fails to attain the NAAQS by the applicable 
attainment date "shall be reclassified by operation of law" to 
the next higher classification. Since reclassification to 
"severe" status will impose stricter pollution control 
requirements upon small entities in the Area, the 
intervenor contends that the EPA erred when it certified 
that the denial of redesignation would not alter the 
requirements applicable to small entities in the Area. 
 
Although the intervenor accurately describes the 
operation of §7511(b)(2)(A), its argument isflawed because 
the more stringent pollution controls will result from the 
rulemaking process that will accompany the reclassification 
under §7511(b)(2)(A), not the rulemaking process through 
which the EPA denied the redesignation request. When the 
time comes for §7511(b)(2)(A) to reclassify the Area by 
operation of law, the EPA will provide notice and an 
opportunity for the public to comment, which will include 
the opportunity to comment on the requirements of the 
RFA. The EPA made this observation in its certification 
statement, when it said that "to the extent that the area 
must adopt regulations, based on its nonattainment status, 
EPA will review the effect of those actions on small entities 
at the time the Commonwealth submits those regulations." 
For this reason, we conclude that the EPA correctly 
determined that small entities would not be affected by the 
particular rulemaking at issue in this case, namely, the 





For the reasons discussed above, we deny the petition for 
review of the EPA's final rule denying Pennsylvania's 
request to redesignate the Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley area 
from nonattainment to attainment status. 
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BECKER, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I join in Judge Alito's fine opinion. This brief concurrence 
is merely to record my view that there is something amiss, 
or at least unfair, in the EPA's treatment of regions such as 
the Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley nonattainment area which, 
because of the geographical configuration of the jet stream, 
receives a constant infusion of transported ozone from 
highly industrialized upwind sources. Although I lack the 
technical expertise of the agency, my immersion in the 
record in this case has left the distinct and indelible 
impression that, while laudably attempting to fulfill its 
statutory mission of assuring cleaner air, the EPA has paid 
insufficient attention to: (1) the difficulty that downwind 
areas such as Southwestern Pennsylvania have in meeting 
the ozone NAAQS, and (2) more importantly, the imperative 
of infusing its regulations with equity. The economic 
consequences to the area as the result of continued 
nonattainment status are enormous, as this record 
demonstrates, and surely assuring equity vis-a-vis other 
areas of the nation is within the agency's charter. I suspect 
there are several avenues through which the EPA could 
afford relief to the Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley region and 
other similarly situated areas without violating its statutory 
mandate. 
 
Modest escape valves already exist within the current 
regulatory structure. For example, an EPA guideline 
permits the "flagging" of data affected by certain exceptional 
events in carrying out various regulatory tasks. As Judge 
Alito explains, this guideline authorizes the EPA to 
disregard ozone data influenced by the phenomenon of 
stratospheric ozone intrusion. See U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Office of Air 
Quality Planning and Standards, Monitoring and Data 
Analysis Division, Guideline on the Identification and Use of 
Air Quality Data Affected by Exceptional Events, EPA- 
450/4-86-007 (July 1986). Additionally, the EPA has 
acknowledged that it has, in the past, excluded ozone data 
affected by forest fires in evaluating other redesignation 
requests. 
 
The presence of these exceptions highlights the problem 
faced by communities such as the Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley 
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area, whose herculean and largely successful efforts to 
combat air pollution may be derailed due to circumstances 
(upwind ozone) beyond its control. The tremendous 
remedial efforts undertaken by those regions seem to have 
been inadequately considered when contrasted with the 
aforementioned regulatory mollifications. 
 
I would urge Congress to address the burdens faced by 
the Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley nonattainment region and 
other areas in the same predicament. Congress has taken 
into account the problem of transported ozone in the past, 
excusing certain so-called "rural transport areas" from 
certain pollution control requirements. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7511a(h). I see no reason to treat metropolitan areas 
differently, especially where, as here, a region has achieved 
such significant emissions improvements. I acknowledge 
the potentially ameliorative effects of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., but it does not 
directly address the problems facing Southwestern 
Pennsylvania. 
 
I would also urge the EPA to address these problems in 
the regulatory context. If the EPA and Congress 
satisfactorily address the referenced issues, we may be able 
to avoid a succession of expensive and burdensome 
litigations like this one. Judge Scirica joins in this 
concurrence. 
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